从这里了解印度人对中国的看法

印度前外交秘书长论述如何应对快速崛起的中国

2012-09-15 19:47 37个评论 字号:

印度前外交秘书长希亚姆·萨兰(Shyam Saran)在一次演讲中,总结了自己外交生涯中与中国打交道的经验。他在演讲中称,为了应对快速崛起的中国,印度需要了解中国文化本质、文化特质和中国人的世界观。希亚姆强调了中国汉字在中国文化的重要性,称中国文化是视觉文化,印度文化是听觉文化。他还称,误解和缺乏交流是中印关系的特色,很大程度上源于印度没有熟悉中国人的思维过程。在应对中国挑战方面,希亚姆称印度应该部署足够强大的军事力量,以让中方相信侵略性举措会招来反制举措。

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原文标题:How India must deal with an ascendant China
原文链接:http://www.rediff.com/news/slide-show/slide-show-1-how-india-must-deal-with-an-ascendant-china/20120831.htm

中国主席和印度总理

中国主席和印度总理

(三泰虎注:演讲稿分两部分,本文为第一部分)

Much of what I will say is drawn from my own experience of China, an abiding fascination with its unique civilization and a deep respect for its philosophical and cultural heritage. My justification for indulging in this rather broad sweep analysis is that managing the China challenge requires a much deeper understanding of the nature of Chinese civilization, its cultural particularities and the worldview of its people, formed layer upon layer, over 5,000 years of unbroken though sometimes tumultuous history.

China is undergoing a dramatic transformation and its traditional culture and ways of thinking can no longer be sourced only to persistent templates derived from the past. One has to only look at how modern, digital culture has pervaded Chinese society, in particular, its youth, to be cautious in making judgments about the country’s view of itself.

Nevertheless, there are certain deeply rooted elements that shape China’s psyche and its world view that are worth careful reflection, including where India fits into that broad consciousness. At various points, I will also try and contrast Chinese and Indian cultural and philosophical traits, so that one is better prepared in adjusting one’s own template in judging Chinese behaviour.

大部分我将要说的是自己在中国的经验之谈,包含了其独特文化带来的持久魅力和对其哲学和文化遗产的深深尊重。我沉湎于这个宽泛分析的理由是,应对中国挑战需要对中国文化本质、文化特质和人们的世界观有更深层次理解,这些在中国连续不断却偶尔动荡的5000多年历史里一层又一层叠加起来。

中国正经历巨大改变,其传统文化和思考方式已无法仅仅追溯至过去的老套范本,你必须观察现代数字文化如何渗透入中国社会,特别是年轻人中,小心判断这个国家对自身的看法。

然而,有一些根深蒂固的元素塑造了中国灵魂及其世界观,值得谨慎思考,包括印度在这种广泛意识中的切入点在哪里。在诸多观点中,我会尽量让中印两国各自的文化和哲学特征形成对照,以便大家在判断中国人行为时能更好地调整自己的思维套路。

If there is one singular and unique feature of Chinese civilisation that distinguishes it from other major civilisations, it is the use of Chinese ideograms and characters, that survive with few changes to this day, since they first appeared on oracle bones, some 3,500 years or more ago, during the ancient Shang dynasty. The Chinese language has no alphabet. Each character is a word in itself and a decent vocabulary requires memorising at least 3,000 characters. A scholar may aspire to a vocabulary of 5,000.

‘Classical Chinese’, in the words of one scholar, Peter Hessler, the author of Oracle Bones, “Connected people over space and time. It provided a powerful element of unity to an empire that, from another perspective, was a mish-mash of ethnic groups and languages”.

After I had learnt Mandarin in Hong Kong in the early 1970s, I would often communicate with the local Cantonese using my new found knowledge of Chinese characters, because my Mandarin was as unintelligible to them as their Cantonese dialect was to me.

What is to be appreciated in this context is the importance of the written word in Chinese culture and the transformation of Chinese ideograms into an essential element in Chinese aesthetics. Calligraphy is a much admired accomplishment and characters appear as an integral component in paintings as well as Chinese pottery.

如果说中国文化有一种独特特征让其区别于其他主要文明,那么就是中国表意文字和汉字的使用。自从首次出现在3500年前左右商朝时期的甲骨上后,中国汉字只出现了一些改变,一直存活至今。中文没有字母,每个汉字本身就是一个词。你至少得记住3000个汉字才能说得上拥有像样的词汇量。学者可能渴望掌握5000个汉字。

学者彼得·海斯勒是《甲骨文》的作者,用他的话说是:“古汉语在空间和时间上把人连接起来,为帝国提供了强大的统一元素,从另一个角度来说,是少数族群及其语言的大杂烩。

1970年代早期,在香港学会普通话后,我经常使用新掌握的中国汉字和广东本地人交流,因为普通话在广东本地人听起来和广东话在我听起来,都是不知所云。

由此而论,值得欣赏的是书面文字在中国文化的重要性,以及中国表意文字向中国美学基本元素的转变。书法是一项值得大为称赞的成就,汉字成为中国绘画和瓷器不可或缺的一部分。

原创翻译:三泰虎 http://www.santaihu.com

一名男子在人行道上写字

一名男子在人行道上写字

Contrast this with Indian culture, where the spoken word is pre-eminent. The ancient Vedas were heard as Srutis and were then remembered as Smritis. The written word came much later. Mantras get energised only when they are recited in the correct rhythm and tone. Beauty is imparted and sought through arrangements of sound; imagery is not of the same order.

To an Indian, Chinese music sounds stilted and archaic, while Indian classical music is a breathtaking mastery of seven notes and several microtones in between, forever reinventing itself. It is for this reason that I consider Chinese to be a predominantly visual culture, a legacy of the ancient ideogram, while India’s is a predominantly aural culture, where spoken word, the musical note, the sacred mantra, were to become the defining characteristics of the culture.

This difference in civilisational trajectory has its impact on how our two cultures perceive the world around us and interact with one another. The emphasis on the written word led to an immense treasury of historical documentation in China. The Chinese pilgrims, Fa Xian and Xuan Zhuang left elaborate records of their journeys to India and its great universities of Taxila, Nalanda and Vikramshila.

与之形成鲜明对比的是,口头语言在印度文化中是杰出的。古老的吠陀经被当做圣典流传下来。书面文字的出现要迟得多。只有以正确的节奏和语调朗诵,祷文才有活力。

对于一名印度人来说,中国音乐听起来僵硬和古老,而印度古典音乐是7个音符和几个微分音混搭的惊人杰作,永远具有自我再造能力。正是这个原因,我认为中国文化主要是视觉文化,是古老表意文字的遗产,而印度文化主要是听觉文化,口头语言、音符、神圣祷文成为印度文化的界定性徵

文化轨迹的差异对两种文化如何看待周围世界产生了影响,也对两种文化的交流产生了影响。对书面文字的强调给中国带来了历史记录文档这一巨大宝库。中国朝圣者法显和玄奘详细记录了前往印度的旅程,还描述了塔克西拉、那烂陀和维克拉姆西拉等大学。

In contrast, while it is estimated that the beginning of the 6th century AD, the number of Indian Buddhist monks and teachers in China were upwards of 3,000, no accounts of China, as they perceived their adopted country, have surfaced so far. Only some legends survive in temples associated with the more famous among them, such as the Shaolin temple linked with the Zen master.

Bodhidhama and the Fei lai Feng temple, or the Peak that Flew Over in Chinese, located in Hangzhou, associated with the Buddhist monk, known only by his Chinese name, Huili. Huili came from Rajgir and chose the location of his temple at the foot of a peak that resembled Gridhkuta in his native town. Hence the Peak that Flew Over.

The great value attached to the written word, bound as it has been with Chinese aesthetics and the thought process of a complex culture, has combined with an enormous and detailed historical record to provide a contemporary reference point and multi-faceted prism through which the world is perceived.

Even to this day much of Chinese discourse is conducted through historical analogies, some of which are explicit and well known. Some are artfully coded and the language lends itself easily to innuendo and ambiguity. The contrast with India will be apparent where history is often a distraction.

In Chinese diplomatic behavior, this cultural particularity poses unusual challenges to any interlocutor or negotiator.

据估计,公元6世纪伊始,印度佛教僧侣和讲师在中国的数量超过3000人。然而迄今为止,中国方面的数据没有披露。只有一些比较著名的僧侣依附于寺庙成为传说被流传下来。比如禅宗大师的少林寺。

菩提达摩和杭州的飞来峰寺(灵隐寺),这位佛教高僧以其中文名“Huili”著称。他来自王舍城,选择与家乡地貌类似的一座山峰脚下建寺庙,飞来峰寺由此得名。

即使到今天,中国人的很大部分论述是以历史类推法来演进,其中一些是显而易见和众所周知的,一些是巧妙地隐藏,能轻易传达含沙射影和模棱两可的意思。在中国外交,这种文化给对话者或谈判者带来了不寻常的挑战。

中印边界的印方士兵

中印边界的印方士兵

The Chinese will insistently demand and sometimes obtain explicit formulations from friend and adversary alike on issues of importance to their interests, but will rarely concede clarity and finality in formulations reflecting the other side’s interests.

Thus, there is the recurring demand that India reaffirm, time and again, its recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. In 2003, during then Prime Minister A B Vajpayee’s visit, China conceded Sikkim as a part of India but this was not explicitly recorded in a written formulation.

In 2005, during Wen Jiabao’s visit to India, China went a step further and handed over maps of China, showing Sikkim as part of India. Recently, some Chinese scholars have pointed out that the absence of an official statement recognising Indian sovereignty leaves the door open to subsequent shifts if necessary.

I also recall seeing the record of conversation between diplomat R K Nehru and Chinese Premier Zhou en-Lai in 1962, some months before the border war erupted in October that year. R K Nehru drew attention to reports that China was leaning towards the Pakistani position that Jammu and Kashmir was disputed territory.

He recalled to Zhou an earlier conversation, where when asked whether China accepted Indian sovereignty over J&K, he had said, rhetorically — Has China ever said that it does not accept Indian sovereignty over J&K, or words to that effect?

At this latest encounter, Zhou turned the same formulation on its head, to ask, has China ever said that India has sovereignty over J&K? Much of the misunderstanding and lack of communication that has characterised India-China relations may be sourced to the failure on India’s part to be conversant with Chinese thought processes.

在自身利益攸关的问题上,中国人会坚持要求朋友或者对手明确阐述立场,但是在反映对方利益的问题上,他们很少清晰阐述立场。

因此,中国人会周期性要求印度一次又一次承认中国对xz的主权。2003年,时任总理瓦杰帕伊访华期间,中国承认锡金是印度的一部分,但没有在书面陈述中明确记录。

2005年,温总理访印期间,中国更进了一步,移交给印度一幅锡金被标印度一部分的中国地图。最近,一些中国学者指出,在承认印度对锡金拥有主权方面,中国官方声明的缺失给必要时的立场改变打开了一扇门。

我也记得见过尼赫鲁和中国总理周恩来1962年的谈话记录,在该谈话的几个月后,也就是当年的10月,边界战争爆发。

尼赫鲁忆起以前与周恩来的一次谈话。在该谈话中,尼赫鲁问周恩来,即中国是否承认印度对查馍克什米尔的主权。周恩来措辞精明地说:中国有说过不承认印度对查馍克什米尔的主权吗,或者有说过类似的话吗?

这回,周恩来套用同样的话,反问道:中国有说过印度对查馍克什米尔拥有主权吗?误解和缺乏交流是中印关系的特色,很大程度上源于印度没有熟悉中国人的思维过程。

It is easy to accuse the Chinese of betrayal, as Nehru did after the 1962 war, but a clear awareness that deception is, after all, an integral element of Chinese strategic culture, may have spared us much angst in the past. Such awareness should certainly be part of our confronting the China challenge in the future.

Deception, let me add, is not unique to Chinese strategic thinking. The Mahabharata has examples of its efficacy and Chanakya is an ardent enthusiast. But in China it is accorded a value much more significant than in other cultures.

I think many in this well-informed audience may be familiar with the Chinese classic, The Romance of the three Kingdoms, and the oft-quoted ‘Ruse of the Empty City’, depicted therein, which is a favourite part of Chinese lore.

This was resorted to by the famous Shu Kingdom general Zhuge Liang. The general was in danger of being besieged and over-run at the fortress city of Xicheng by the Wei army, while his main forces were located a long distance away.

正如尼赫鲁在1962年中印战争后所做的那样,指责中国人背叛是容易的。但一个清晰的认识可能省却我们过去的许多焦虑,即欺骗毕竟是中国战略文化不可或缺的元素。这样的认识肯定应成为我们未来迎接中国挑战的一部分。

补充一下,欺骗不是中国人战略思维所独有的。《摩呵婆罗多》有类似的例子,考底利耶是骗术的狂热爱好者。但是欺骗在中国文化被赋予的价值远大于其他文化。(三泰虎注:摩呵婆罗多,一译《玛哈帕腊达》,与《罗摩衍那》并称为印度两大史诗)

我认为,许多博学的听众可能熟悉中国人的古典名著《三国演义》,其中的“空城计”是中国脍炙人口的学问。此计是蜀国著名大将诸葛亮的一招。这位大将被魏军围困于西城要塞,而自己的主力部队却还在很远的地方。

中印边界上的印军士兵

中印边界上的印军士兵

Zhuge Liang ordered all the city gates to be opened and asked his soldiers to don the clothes of ordinary householders, going about their normal activities, while he parked himself on top of one of the city gates, calmly playing the Chinese string instrument, the Qin.

The Wei general, Sima Yi, confronted with this strange spectacle, suspected that he would run into an ambush as soon as he entered the city gates and withdrew. And the day was saved for Shu.

Zhu Geliang is credited with the observation that to win a war, it was necessary to steal into the mind of one’s enemy, observe his thought processes, and then fashion the appropriate strategy. There is no moral or ethical dimension attached to deception and the Chinese would find it odd being accused of ‘betrayal’, in particular, if the strategy of deception had worked.

What is required from our strategists and diplomats is to understand this important instrument in the Chinese strategic tool-box and learn to deal with it effectively. Perhaps we should take to heart Zhuge Liang’s advice and enter the mind of our Chinese interlocutor to judge his mental and psychological construct.

诸葛亮命令打开所有城门,要求士兵穿上平民衣服,从事正常活动,自己呆在一座城门上,平心静气地弹琴。

面对这一奇怪景象,魏国将军司马懿怀疑一旦进入城内就会遭埋伏,遂而撤军。

诸葛亮的成功归功于他的观察,即为了赢得战争,有必要了解敌人的想法,洞察对手的思维过程,然后制定合适的策略。这种骗术不会被扯上任何道德或者伦理问题。如果被指责“背叛”,那么中国人会感觉奇怪,特别是欺骗战术起作用后更是如此。

我们的战略家和外交官必须理解中国人战略工具箱里的这个重要工具,并学会有效应对。或许,我们应该接受诸葛亮的建议,摸透中国谈判者的思维,以判断其精神和心理构想。

原创翻译:三泰虎 http://www.santaihu.com

Another important feature of Chinese thinking is what I would call, ‘contextualising’. Significant decisions and actions must always be located in a broad assessment of political, economic, social and even psychological factors that constitute the stage setting for the proposed activity.

This lends an inherent prudence to Chinese strategic thinking, but once events have brewed to the right mix, action must be swift and decisive.

The Chinese strategist may wish to avoid war, if such a war carries inordinate risk. However, the use of force is an essential and accepted part of pursuing national interests and war is not necessarily an unmitigated evil. The Indian attitude towards the use of force and the dangers of war is more ambiguous.

The use of force is often seen as a failure of diplomacy not an extension of it. And this is an important difference between the two countries. The conversations between Nehru and Mao in 1956 on the nature of war reflects this clearly.

Let me try and illustrate this by examining some of the events leading up to the 1962 border war. In January 2005, Chinese television broadcast a documentary entitled ‘The Secret History of the China-India War’. This documentary is important for two reasons.

It painstakingly spells out the domestic, regional and international context within which the decision to launch the attack against Indian border forces was taken. It refers to the hesitation within certain sections of the party leadership to ‘make an enemy out of India’, at a time when China was still recovering from the ravages of famine and the disastrous consequences of the 1958-61 Great Leap Froward.

中国人思维的另一个重要特征是我所说的“背景化”。重要的决定和行动总是在广泛评估政治、经济、社会、甚至心理因素的情况下做出的。这导致中国人战略思维与生俱来的审慎性。不过,一旦事情酝酿的火候刚好,那么行动必定是快速和果断的。

如果战争会带来太大风险,中国战略家可能希望避免战争。然而,武力的使用是追求国家利益的必要和可接受手段,战争并非就全然是邪恶的。印度人对使用武力和战争危险的态度更加模棱两可。

武力的使用经常被看做是外交的失败,而不是外交的延伸。这是两国之间一个很重要的差异。1956年尼赫鲁和毛就战争本质的谈话清晰反应了这点。

让我试着通过审查一些导致1962年中印边界战争发生的事情来阐述这点。2005年1月,中国电视播放了纪录片《中印战争秘史》。两个原因决定了这部纪录片的重要性。

纪录片煞费苦心地表明,对印度发起攻击的决定是在综合考虑国内、地区和国际环境而做出的。还提到了党内某些领导层就“竖立印度这个敌人”的犹豫,当时中国仍然有待从大饥荒和1958-61年的大跃进的灾难后果中恢复过来。

原文图片

原文图片

The international situation was also not judged to be favourable. The ideological conflict with the Soviet Union, the commentary says, had now become a state to state conflict as well. The United States continued with its hostile policies towards China and the Chiang regime in Taiwan was becoming more aggressive. This is an example of the ‘contextualising’ approach.

This probably corresponded to the assessment of Chinese posture on the Indian side; briefly, that while border skirmishes would continue, China was unlikely to engage in a full-scale war.

However, from summer of 1962, the ‘context’ had begun to change and the clues to this change were missed by the Indian side. After having retreated to the ‘second line of leadership’ in the wake of the failure of the Great Leap Forward, Mao plotted his return to absolute leadership, using the People’s Liberation Army with the new Defence Minister Lin Piao, who had replaced Marshal Peng Tehuai, as an ally.

The documentary points to differences of opinion within the party leadership on the border issue. This, it said, was settled by the denunciation of those who counseled restraint, as ‘right opportunists’.

国际形势也被认为不利。纪录片评论道,中国和苏联的意识形态冲突已经演变成国与国之间的冲突,美国继续奉行对华敌视政策,台湾的蒋介石变得越来越好斗。这是“背景化”的一个例子。

这可能与印方对中国姿态的评估相一致。简言之,即边界冲突会继续,但中国不大可能打全面战争。

然而,从1962年夏季开始,“背景”开始改变,印方错失变化的迹象。大跃进失败让毛退居“二线领导”,毛阴谋恢复绝对领导,任用接任彭德怀元帅国防部长职务的林彪指挥解放军。

纪录片指出党领导层在边界问题上的分歧。那些建议克制的人被谴责为“右倾机会主义分子”,分歧最终得到解决。

While having temporarily ceded the administration of the party and the government to other veteran leaders like Liu Shaoqi and Peng Zhen, Mao appears to have taken charge of issuing directives to the PLA personally, on handling border tensions with India. It was he who decided in August 1962, to engage in a full scale military assault on Indian forces, and to ‘liquidate the invading Indian Army’.

But this was done only after his commanders had reported that the Indian side simply had neither the numbers nor the equipment to withstand a Chinese attack, particularly if the attack was of an unexpected scale. On the international front, too, there was a window of opportunity, mitigating some of the constraints cited earlier.

In June, 1962, the Chinese Ambassador Wang Bingnan had inquired from his US counterpart in Warsaw whether the US would take advantage of India-China border tensions, to encourage a Taiwanese attack on the mainland. He obtained a categorical assurance which he claims, in his memoirs, played a big role in the decision to go to war with India.

Thanks to the impending Cuban missile crisis, the then Soviet Union sought Chinese support by conveying its intention to side with China in the border conflict with India.

China may not have known about the looming US-Soviet crisis, but it certainly profited from the Soviet change of heart, temporary though this proved to be. Perhaps it is too much to expect that Indian decision makers would have connected these dots together, but that is precisely what is necessary in dealing with China.

暂时向刘少奇等其他资深领导人交出党和政府管理权的同时,毛似乎负责亲自向PLA发号施令,以应对中印边界紧张形势。正是毛在1962年8月决定对印度军队发起全面军事攻击,以“清算入侵的印军”。

但这个决定的做出是在指挥官汇报后做出的,报告称印军的规模和装备都难以经受住中国人的攻击,特别是意外规模的攻击。国际方面也有一个机会窗口期,减轻了前述一些限制。

1962年6月,中国大使王炳南在华沙询问美国同行,即美国是否会利用中印边界紧张形势,鼓励台湾攻击大陆。他获得了明确保证。在回忆录中,他宣称这个保证对决定与印度交战起到了重大作用。

多亏了迫在眉睫的古巴导弹危机,当时的苏联为了获得中国人的支持,向其传达了在边界冲突支持中国的意向。

中国可能不知道潜在的美苏危机,但苏联的看法改变虽然后来被证明只是暂时的,不过中国无疑从中受益。或许,中国太过期待印度决策者把这些事件节点连起来,但这也恰恰是印度对付中国的必要之举。

塔格拉山脉(Thagla Ridge)地图

塔格拉山脉(Thagla Ridge)

The other example of the importance of contextualising may be seen through a contrary example. In 1971, during the Bangladesh war, the US and China were allies supporting Pakistan. Henry Kissinger tried to persuade the Chinese to attack India along the Sino-Indian border as a means of relieving pressure on their common ally, Pakistan.

In the papers of Alexander Haig, who was White House Chief of Staff at the time, it is reported that he did receive a formal reply from the Chinese side, conveying that China had decided not to move troops to the Sino-Indian border. On can confidently surmise that the constraining ‘context’ in this regard was the Indo-Soviet treaty of 1971.

Lest any one believes that Chinese strategists always get things right, I would like to recall what happened in 1986 during the Wangdung incident in the eastern sector. In 1985, China began to signal that the so-called ‘package proposal’ for resolving the border issue, essentially legitimising the post-1962 status quo, was no longer on offer.

另一个彰显“背景化”重要性的例子可以通过一个反例看出。1971年,在孟加拉战争期间,美国和中国是支持巴基斯坦的盟友。亨利·基辛格努力劝说中国沿着中印边界袭击印度,以减轻共同盟友巴基斯坦所面临的压力。

时任白宫办公室主任亚历山大·黑格提交的文件显示,他确实收到了来自中方的正式回复,传达的是这样一个信息:中国决定不向中印边界派遣部队。有人可能自信地猜测,这个限制性的“背景”是苏印1971年条约。

为了避免有人相信中国战略家总是对的,我想回忆1986年在东段发生的事件。1985年,中国开始暗示,解决边界争端的所谓“一揽子建议”不再起作用。该“一揽子建议”基本上把1962年冲突后的现状合法化。

原创翻译:三泰虎 http://www.santaihu.com

In official talks, Chinese officials stated explicitly for the first time that since the disputed area in the eastern sector was much larger than in the western sector, India would have to make significant concessions in that sector and China would reciprocate with appropriate concessions (unspecified) in the west. It was also conveyed to us that at a minimum Tawang would have to be transferred to the Chinese side.

When we pointed out that just three years back in 1982 Deng Xiaoping had himself spelt out the package proposal as we had hitherto understood it, the response was that we may have read too much into his words. The shift could have been related to a greater level of confidence following China’s rapid growth and the fact that a young and as yet untested prime minister had taken office in Delhi.

This was followed by the discovery in the summer of 1986 that the Chinese had crossed the Thagla Ridge and occupied a feature called Le, built permanent barracks as well as a helipad. In my view this was in some way linked to the hardening of the Chinese position on the border and the new insistence on India making concessions in the eastern sector.

I recall accompanying Ambassador K P S Menon to lodge a protest with the then Chinese assistant foreign minister and being witness to a most undiplomatic, offensive and vituperative harangue by the latter. He claimed that China was, of course, on its own territory, that it was only ‘strengthening border management’ after the neglect of recent years and that India would be prudent not to over-react.

在正式会谈中,中国官员首次明确阐述:由于东段争议地区比西段大得多,印度应该在东段做出明显让步,中国会在西段以合适让步作为补偿。还向我们表达这样一个信息,即至少得把达旺移交给中方。

当我们指出,就在三年前的1982年,邓小平自己说出了一揽子建议,我们迄今还心照不宣。我们得到的回复是我们可能过度解读了他的话。中国的立场改变与其随着快速经济发展而来的更大自信有关,此外还与一个事实有关,即年轻但无经验的总理在德里就职。

随后在1986年夏季,印方发现中国人越过了塔格拉山脉,占领了一个叫做勒的地方,修建了永久性兵营以及直升机停机坪。在我看来,这某种程度上与中国边界立场变得强硬和坚持印度在东段做出让步有关。

我记得陪同梅农大使向时任中国助理外长提出抗议,并见证了后者最无外交策略、最无礼和最出言不逊的慷慨陈词。他宣称中国当然是在自己领土上,只是在经过数年疏忽后“加强边界管理”而已,印度应该谨慎,不应过度反应。

行进中的印军

行进中的印军

Soon thereafter I was transferred from Beijing to Tokyo, but en route in Delhi I attended a strategy session called to discuss our counter moves. There was, I admit, a reluctance to take any military counter measures.

However a couple of weeks later I learnt that the then Army Chief K Sundarji had airlifted troops and occupied a parallel ridge, known by the peaks Lurongla, Hathungla and Sulunga, overlooking the Sumdorung river. Two forward posts, Jaya and Negi, were set up across the river just below the ridge and only 10 metres from a Chinese forward post.

The Chinese were taken completely by surprise as perhaps were our own political leaders. The then External Affairs Minister N D Tiwari was transiting Beijing on his way back from Pyongyang after attending the Non-Aligned Coordination Bureau meeting that September, to try and assuage Chinese anger.

I was accompanying him en-route to Tokyo having been deputed to Pyongyang to assist our delegation.

此后不久,我被从北京调到东京,途中在德里参加了一场战略会议,讨论我们的反制措施。我承认,大家在会议上不情愿采取任何军事反制措施。

然而几周后,我获悉时任陆军参谋长桑达吉空运部队并占领了一个平行山脉,俯视Sumdorung河。在山脉脚下的河对面建立了两个分别叫Jaya和Negi的前沿哨所,离中国哨所只有10米远。

中国人极为惊奇。时任外交部长提瓦里9月在平壤参加不结盟合作会议后,返回途中路过北京,试图平息中国人的愤怒。

我陪同他前往东京,被任命前往平壤协助印度代表团。

Senior Chinese foreign ministry officials were at hand at the airport to receive our delegation. In the brief exchange that took place at the airport, our minister’s protestations of peace and goodwill were met with the not unreasonable comment that while our leaders were talking peace they were making aggressive military moves on the ground at the same time.

China would only be satisfied if Indian troops vacated the ridge they had occupied. China would not be fooled; it would “listen to what is said, but see what action is taken.” In later talks we agreed to vacate the heights on our side if the Chinese retreated behind the Thagla ridge, but since they were not ready to do so, we stayed put as well. While we may not have planned it this way, the Chinese judged our actions through their own prism: that we had countered their unexpected move by a well orchestrated counter move of our own.

Subsequently, I am told, that the offensive and overbearing tone adopted by Chinese foreign ministry officials also changed to being more polite and civilised. The next several years were spent in the two sides discussing disengagement in this sector and finally in 1992, the eyeball to eyeball confrontation was ended and a number of confidence building measures adopted.

The lesson to be drawn is not that we should be militarily provocative but that we should have enough capabilities deployed to convince the other side that aggressive moves would invite counter moves. This is the reason why it is so important for us to speed up the upgradation of our border infrastructure and communication links along all our borders, not just with China.

中国高级外交官员在机场接待我们代表团。在机场简短交流后,我们部长和平善意的抗议得到的回应是不理智的言论:我们领导人谈论和平,他们却同时在地面上采取侵略性的军事行动。

只有印度军队撤出所占领的山脉,中国才会满意。中国不傻,会“听其言、观其行”。在随后的会谈中,我们表示:如果中国人撤到塔格拉山脉后,那么我们同意撤出己方山脉。但是由于他们不愿意这样做,所以我们也留在那里了。我们可能没有这样计划,但是中国人以自己的方式判断我们的行动:即我们以精心策划的举措来反制他们的意外举动。

此后,我被告知中国外交官员无礼和傲慢的语气也变得更礼貌和更文明。中印未来几年讨论在该地区脱离接触。最终在1992年,面对面的对峙结束了,许多建立互信的举措被采纳。

值得吸取的教训不是我们应该在军事上挑衅,而是我们应该部署足够强大的军事力量,以让对方相信侵略性举措会招来反制举措。所以,加快升级边界基础设施和沿着边界升级通信线路非常重要。

以下是印度网民的评论:

Managing relations with china can be easy!
by Grizzly

Its not that hard to reason with people who have been our neighbours for thousands of years! We know them and they know us! We both know each others likes and dislikes! And neither of us certainly wants nuke wars!

So, why is it been so hard to manage this relationship?

1. Recent history suggests that chinese have become wary of us becoz the English were growing drugs in India and selling them to chinese for more than two hundred years before we got freedom from them! Although India was forced under british rule to grow these drugs, chinese were unhappy becoz in a way we had assisted their enemy!

2. India gave shelter to Dalai Lama after the Sino-Tibet war. china regards him as a rebel leader while we see him as a legitimate religious leader of Tibet!

These are the two big issues from the past!

If we can make them feel that past is past and we want to move forward and build a fruitful relationship with them, they will follow! chinese like powerful people and they respect it. Unfortunately mms does not project power and nobody respects him internationally!

Until we can find a charismatic leader who will project confidence, china will sit on the sidelines!

与几千年的邻居理论并非那么难!我们了解他们,他们也了解我们!我们都知道彼此的喜好和厌恶!我们都不想要核战争!

所以,中印关系为什么如此难协调呢?

1、近代史显示,在我们从英国获得独立前的两百多年里,英国人在印度种植毒品,并把毒品卖给中国人,所以中国人一直对我们持有戒心!虽然我们处于英国统治之下, 被迫种植毒品,但是我们某种程度上助纣为虐,所以中国人不高兴。

2、中(国)西(藏)战争后印度给达赖提供庇护。中国把他看做是背叛领导人,而我们把他看做xz的合法宗教领袖!

这些是过去的两个大问题!

如果我们能让他们这样认为,即过去的就过去了,我们需要往前看,要建立卓有成效的中印关系,那么他们会照着做的!中国人喜欢和尊敬强者。

在我们找到一个能表现自信的魅力非凡领导人之前,中国会作壁上观!

原创翻译:三泰虎 http://www.santaihu.com

china’s is _not_ a problem for india
by shilpy

the corrupt gandhi congress is.

对于印度来说,中国不是一个麻烦,腐败的甘地国大党才是。

simple
by tar sha

We must be in MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) position with China. That means 150-200 bombs can be delivered to any point in china via air/sea/water. And we must send clear signal that additional help to pakistan will result in india giving agni missiles to Taiwan and all other nation in south china sea.

我们必须与中国确保相互摧毁。这意味着可以通过空中和海上,把150至200枚(核)弹打到中国任何地方。我们必须发出明确信号,即继续帮助巴基斯坦会导致印度把烈火导弹给台湾和其他南海国家。

Re: simple
by David Dak
India has to pay to those countries to take your agni missiles as insurance because they do not want their people killed during firing.

由于那些国家不想让自己人民在发射时被炸死,印度必须向那些国家支付保险费,这样他们才会要你们的烈火导弹。

Shiva is chinese
by Mahakavi jollydoss

Hindu deity Shiva sits in Mount Kailash which has never, ever been part of India. It is in Chinese controlled Tibet.

湿婆神是中国人。

印度教湿婆神居住在冈仁波齐峰,这个山峰从来不是印度的一部分,位于中国人控制的xz境内。

What is India ?
by Alamgir Aurangzeb

The British prime minister Churchill said India is not a nation or a culture. It is a region like the Equator, Balkans or Mariana Trench.

Infact, India is a parking lot for all other Asian races.

But China is a nation with a single tongue and race.

英国首相丘吉尔说过,印度不是一个国家或者文化,是一个像赤道、巴尔干半岛或者马里亚纳海沟等那样的地理名词。

事实上,印度是其他亚洲种族的停车场。

但中国是单一语言和种族的国家。

Re: What is India ?
by youngcitizen
well we must solve our indian problems in india.i am also against this fightings against religion,caste,language,regionalism.our constituion has also not supported for that.churchill was a person who came to india because he did not get food anywhere.i suppport india in this that despite of so many variations we are in one country.i request all indians to be united and raise your country to good levels.stop fighting on cheap and baseless issues.enjoy and help others.this is the life.be happy..

我们必须解决印度存在的问题。我也反对宗教、种姓、语言和地区之间的争斗。我们的宪法也没有支持这样的争斗。丘吉尔在其他地方讨不到东西吃,所以就来印度。尽管有如此多差异,我们还是在一个国家里。我请求所有印度人团结起来,把国家提升至良好水平,停止为毫无根据的卑微问题而斗争。乐于帮助他人。生活就是这样…

Re: What is India ?
by sri
Churchill was a racist of the highest grade and his opinion is of no value. He had worse things to say about muslims and muslim lands. Going back to your point, his understanding of India and yours are of the standard type. You should know India is a meeting of cultures but it is also predominantly one culture and one race with admixures in smaller numbers. Even so, you should also know that China has never had the guts to do any genetic analysis of its population. It keeps talking of its Han people but if they are so confident why dont they test? India is confident enough to get it done but not China. And people like you in your ignorance and hatred spread their propganda.

丘吉尔是种族主义之最,他的观点毫无价值。他用最恶毒的语言评说msl和msl家园。回到你的观点,他和你对印度的理解属于标准的老套。你应该知道,印度是文化的大汇聚,但也是一种文化和一个种族占主导地位。即使如此,你还应知道,中国从来没有勇气对其人口做基因分析,总是说都是汉人。如果真如此自信,为什么他们不测试?印度非常自信,所以做了测试,但中国没有。你这样的人尽显无知,总是宣称仇恨。

原创翻译:三泰虎 http://www.santaihu.com

Re: China Space Research and Military budget is 100 times more th
by kumar kn
We are no match to the Chinese.Our govt is sleeping and is interested to follow Gandhiji policy of goodwill and Ahimsa with Chinese.They gobbled up Tibet without a shot fired from our side. Already the Chinese look down on us as second class.With our misgoverance,
corruption and lack of will we can never be a match to the Chinese who are progressing by leaps and bounds.We cannot even take care of BanglaDesh infiltrators to our country.Forget about China!!

我们和中国人没得比。我们的政府在沉睡,有兴趣遵守甘地主义政策,即对中国人奉行善意和非暴力政策。在我们没有发一枪的情况下,他们吞并了xz。中国人蔑视我们是二等种族。由于管理不善、腐败和缺乏意志,我们永远比不上跳跃式进步的中国人。我们甚至无法应付孟加拉国的渗透者。更别提中国了!

chinese approach
by socrates singh (View MyPage) on Aug 31, 2012 02:28 PM

For the Chinese ‘power flows from the barrel of a gun’.

Forget niceties with our northern neighbours. LOC approach is the best with continous reiteration of the fact of Chinese illegal occupation of parts of India, all of Tibet, islands in the south china sea, inner mongolia, Sinkiang province and threat to Taiwan.

put nothing in writing with the Chinese unless it is a full agreement. Build alliances with Japan, USA, Vietnam and Australia with the objective to contain China. Deny China any access to Indian Ocean bases, by military means if necessary.

中国人相信“枪杆子里出政权”。

别与北方邻国拘泥细节。坚守实际控制线就是最好的方法,同时一直重申一个事实,即中国人非法占领印度的部分领土、整个xz、南海岛屿、内蒙古、xj,还有威胁台湾。

除非是全面协议,否则别与中国人签署任何协议。与日本、美国、越南和澳大利亚建立联盟,目的是围堵中国。拒绝中国进入印度洋,必要时使用武力。

Wonderfully written article with deep perspective
by Talisman

Both the author and rediff deserve praise on publishing this.

文章写得很棒,观点深刻。

作者和rediff发表了这篇文章,应该得到称赞。

Scared
by Just Fun

India is scared of SriLanka also

See how India deals with Sri Lanka.If India doesnt train SL army men SL will join China and pakistan.India is scared of even SL

印度也害怕斯里兰卡。

看看印度如何对付斯里兰卡。如果印度不训练斯里兰卡士兵,斯里兰卡会加入中国和巴基斯坦。印度甚至害怕斯里兰卡。

If you can’t beat them, join them!
by Ujwala Kulkarni

India should learn from China instead of only looking for ways and means to PROTECT itself.

如果你无法打败他们,那就加入他们吧!

除了寻找保护自己的方法,印度还应该向中国学习。

China
by arungopal agarwal

China has become giant with discipline, whereas our leaders are indiscipline in public life. We do not want to take corrective measures anywhere even on population, corruption,employment, only want to cater govt. servants and politicians.

中国靠遵守纪律成为巨人,而我们领导人的公众生活不受约制。我们在任何地方都不想采取矫正措施,甚至在人口、腐败、就业方面也是,只想迎合政府公务员和政客。

Just be self centric for a while
by shiva

All china did for the last 3 or 4 decades was ruthlessly being self centric in every action and approach. what ever decision they took, they took in the best interest of China and its people, as a result it made some enemies along its borders, but the overall result was that it gained a lot of respect and value in the international arena. In reality China is far far behind in many aspect as compared to the USA or the EU. but it is currently PERCEIVED as equals to US and EU. What India must do in the coming years is to adopt a similar strategy, by being very self centric not to bother any thing else. as a result Indians living in india might become a little proud of being indian, which is currently missing.

在过去三四十年里,中国所做的一举一动均是毫不留情地以自我为中心。不管做出什么决定,均是以国家和人民利益的最大化为出发点,结果在边界上制造了一些敌人。但是总的来说,中国在国际舞台上获得了颇多尊重。实际上,中国在许多方面远远落后美国或者欧洲,但目前被看做是与美国和欧洲平等。在未来几年里,印度所必须做的是采纳类似战略,以自我为中心,不要去在意其他事情。结果,居住在国内的印度人可能为作为一名印度人而小小自豪一番,这正是现在所缺失的。

Not possible to face china
by prashant

To face china, we need a strong peoples elected needed who is lion. someone like Modi or even some one from Congress..But not selected by sonia, But elected by people. Only a person who is elected by people will have power or confidence to take such bold decisions. This MMS is puppet and even other nation like china, pakistan know. I wonder what they discuss with MMS when they meet with him, when they know this MMS is not the decision maker But just a PM(post master of sonia). With such leader like MMS, it will be difficult to contain even pakistan or bangaldesh forget china.

要面对中国,我们需要选出强大如狮子般的领导,比如穆迪或者某个来自国大党的人,不是索尼娅选出来的人,而是人民选出来的。只有人民选举出来的人才有力量或者信心做出如此大胆的决定。辛格总理是傀儡,连中国和巴基斯坦等国家也知道这点。我纳闷:既然他们知道辛格总理不是决策者,只是索尼娅的邮递员,那么他们与辛格总理会面时在谈什么。就凭辛格总理那样的领导人,印度要围堵巴基斯坦或者孟加拉国都是困难的,更别提中国了。

china
by denzil harrison

it goes ” what we eat is what we become” we eat adulterated food, drink polluted water, breath polluted air. our mindset, our thought has become polluted. haven’t heard baba ramdev or any one speaking about corruption at grass root level or food adulteration, may be because they will not get publicity in that. what matters to us is simple task.

吃啥长啥。我们吃掺假食物、喝有污染的水、呼吸受污染的空气,所以我们的思维和想法被污染了,从来没有听过拉姆德夫或则其他人谈过基层腐败或者食物掺假。可能是不会被宣传吧…

we need a strong leader from congress itself.
by prashant

I am gr8 bjp fan, But now we must admit…with mussie population increasing from 14% in 1947 to around 25 to 30% now…it will be impossible for BJP to win election on basis of religion. So we will be left with no option But to support congress.. Congressas a party is good, Only bad thing is its heridatory tactics…Its a royal monarchy system , which needs to be removed. Sonia takes very much care that no grass root people come to top level in congress… Only those people who butter sonai get chance like diggy, sibbal,manish. These are not popular leaders…Congress had popular leaders in past, But now there is mass base leader…all suhc people have been removed by sonia…There is revoluation neededin congress which shud give rise to some one who challenges sonia and her powers…Then congress is real good with a non-gandhi leader!

我是印度人民党的伟大粉丝,但我现在必须承认,msl人口所占比例从1947年的14%升至现在的大约25%-30%。印度人民党要想靠宗教来赢得选举是不可能的。所以我们没有选择,只好支持国大党。国大党总体上是好的,唯一不好的是皇家君主制度。这个必须被消灭。索尼娅非常小心地确保没有基层人员能够进入国大党高层。只有那些巴结索尼娅的人才有机会,比如diggy、sibbal、manish。这些人不是受欢迎的领导人。国大党以前有受欢迎的领导人,但现在有群众基础的领导人都被索尼娅免职了。国大党内部暗藏着革命,这种革命能够让某些人出来挑战索尼娅及其力量。在拥有奉行非甘地主义的领导人后,国大党才是真正好的政党!

mass corruption in army too
by prashant

what indian army needs now is tough war!! without any war..it is becomming useless…recent media article said that 30% of armymem are over weight…This happens only when there is no pressure on army for any war….with all suhc things like operation pokhran which are meant for practise are of no practical use …army confidence will only gte booosed by success in actual war. without nay war…there will be huge number of scams… and defence scandals. no one cares whether good army maeterial is comming or even if its really comming becoz all know that india is not going to have war with one for next 10-15 years…compared to china, russia, US… they keep their army involved in many nations and have small small conflicts which prepares their army for big war..

印度军队需要的是艰苦战争!没有战争,军队就会变得无用。最近,有媒体发表文章称30%的军人超重。正是军队没有战争的压力才会这样。博克兰运动这样的行动只是练兵之用,没有实际作用。军队自信只有通过实战胜利来提升。没有战争,军队就会出现大量丑闻。没有人会在意服役的装备是否优质,甚或大家都知道印度在未来10至15年不会发生战争,所以以此为考量来采购装备。中国、俄罗斯和美国让军队干涉许多国家内务,参与了许多小冲突,从而为大战做准备。

原创翻译:三泰虎 http://www.santaihu.com

China and India
by captainjohann samuhanand

Indian attitude reflects our slavery for the last 2000 years.We have not got a single athletic medal but will talk about fighting China withour knowing relative strengths and stamina and staying power.In 1962 our Army had Bhukharies to heat ourselves while the Chinese fought without any such support. They were fully acclimationed with local weather but we require our rations just like the Americans in Afghanistan who want their ice creams and cokes.We must toughen ourselves physically and our mental toughness will follow.Shyam saran talks about understanding Chinese culture and this talk talks about Indian Army action under Sunderji. He should also remember our action in Sikkim under Gen Subeg singh when they retreated against our tough rresponse.We have better sirforce and missiles and let us also concentrate on toughening our physical culture.

印度人的态度反映了我们过去2000年里被奴役的心态。我们没有获得一枚体育奖牌,在不知道相对强势、毅力和持久力的情况下,我们却在谈论与中国战斗。1962年,我们军队有Bhukharies来暖身,但中国人没有这方面的支持。他们完全适应当地气候,但我们需要美国式的给养,比如冰激凌和可乐。我们必须在体质上锻炼自己,后面还要跟上心理坚韧性的锻炼。希亚姆·萨兰讨论了对中国文化的理解,谈到了桑达吉领导下的印军行动。他还应该记得,我们在苏贝格·辛格将军领导下在锡金的行动。当时,在我们的强硬回击之下,中国人撤退了。我们有更好的空军和导弹,让我们也集中加强我们士兵的体质吧。

友荐云推荐
  1. 古汉语在空间和时间上把人连接起来,为帝国提供了强大的统一元素,从另一个角度来说,是少数族群及其语言的大杂烩。

    ——————————————————

    文章值得一看 👿

  2. 中国文化主要是视觉文化,是古老表意文字的遗产,而印度文化主要是听觉文化,口头语言、音符、神圣祷文成为印度文化的界定性徵

  3. 中国人思维的另一个重要特征是我所说的“背景化”。重要的决定和行动总是在广泛评估政治、经济、社会、甚至心理因素的情况下做出的。这导致中国人战略思维与生俱来的审慎性。不过,一旦事情酝酿的火候刚好,那么行动必定是快速和果断的。

  4. 沙发了!!
    说实话这文里的印度人看得很真实,不光是中国人,受中国人的影响,东亚都很认同兵法,这是从几千年的动荡里提练出的精华。。。。
    还有中国人很早就有文字,印度人一直用口头语,所以,在外国人看,中国人很酷,印度人很爱说话。

  5. 吃啥长啥。我们吃掺假食物、喝有污染的水、呼吸受污染的空气,所以我们的思维和想法被污染了,从来没有听………
    ————————————————————————————
    刚看头几句我还以为这位是来讽刺我们的。。。。

  6. 中国和印度的区别是。
    1佛祖讲经讲了四十年。
    2老子写书写了五千字。
    3孔子懒得自己写,都整理前人的。
    ……

  7. 三哥居然还能花这么大心思研究我们?真是令人惊奇。不过研究大部分都是误导的。不分析革命的影响,动不动就几千年文化,和鸦片战争,典型的西方式历史观,你永远也了解不了我们的内心。在我眼里,印度永远是loser

    • 话不能这么说。也许印度现在没有挑战中国的能力,但不能否认他有这个“潜力”。
      所谓“人无远虑,必有近忧”,我们总不能等挑战来了才被动迎战吧,也应注意“潜在”的敌对势力。

  8. 我觉得印度军人跟中国军人即使再同等装备和国力下.印度人都没有优势

    1.印度人身体素质普遍较差.因为很多人不吃肉.中国军队的训练的强度一直是很大的.不仅身体比印度军人强壮.力量更大.更适合耐力战

    2.兵不厌诈的思想自古以来就深入中国人的内心.玩战术.估计印度人不是对手.

    3.印度人种族民族太多.不团结.语言不通.军队指挥不便.而中国虽然几十年没打过仗了.但是现在的中国人都憋着一股劲想打仗.所以打仗会得到百姓的支持.自古以来.百姓支持的战争基本都会胜利的.

    • 说到兵不厌诈。看过印度人那么多的回复,总感觉印度人就是一条脑筋的。整天都单纯到极点,思维超级简单。

  9. 你至少得记住3000个汉字才能说得上拥有像样的词汇量。学者可能渴望掌握5000个汉字。
    ……………………………………………………………………..
    这个汉字掌握程度被低估了,普通的高中生也要达到5000字吧。

      • 好吧,拿上新华字典,仔细数数,到底有多少汉子能认识?有多少汉子认识又能书写?又有多少汉子能认识而不解其意?这会很有趣。你会发现可能认识又能书写的汉字不会超过1000.

  10. 我们要用好祖先给我们留下的财富,多花时间研读领悟其中精华,修身持家,与洋人交锋一定好使。加油炎黄子孙!

  11. 随便写点什么,以支持博主!
    1、印度个别朋友:中国从来不说自己是单一民族国家,我们总是宣传并铭记在脑海的是:中华民族是56个民族,中国是漫长的历史进程中形成的多民族国家。
    2、1962年的战争,我已经说了很多次,起因是印度不顾中国的多次警告,单方面强行实施“前进政策”。想想清楚,印度之前200多年一直被英国殖民,独立后,不仅仅要强行“继承”英国“殖民”的所有土地,还吞并周围更多的领土。你印度都知道英国是个殖民者,你都反对。对于,英国以前殖民其他的土地,你就不反对殖民了,就说是你的,你还真以为你的英国人的儿子啊。就算你是英国人的儿子,英国父亲非法抢夺和霸占的土地,你这个儿子也是要还的。(关于1962年冲突,可以参考基维百科)
    3、更甚的是,英国人都承认(一直承认,清朝时期就承认西藏是中国的一部分,那时关于西藏和“英国的印度”的一些边境问题和清政府签定了几个协定的)西藏是中国的一部分,到现在,印度一部分人竟然不承认,甚至说西藏是印度的。印度人真是无知,太高看自己了。

  12. 三哥无时无刻不表现出一种诡异的优越感,当你认为他们开始认真的对待一个问题的时候,突然表现出的优越感让人对他们的认真表示怀疑

  13. 我很好奇印度的外交观是怎样的。
    美国从二战以来的盟友分别有。 苏联中国日本德国伊朗伊拉克阿富汗以及本拉登。 问题是他的敌人同样也是这些人….

  14. 怎么说呢?这位部长先生在谈到中国的文化、两国的差异,甚至冲突的历程时,还比较懂行。毕竟这和他的职业有关。