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可怕! 巴基斯坦和中国的核武器对印度意味着什么

SCARY! What Pakistan and China's nuclear weapons mean for India

可怕!巴基斯坦和中国的核武器对印度意味着什么?

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Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is growing at a faster rate than predicted, with a reliable report from the non-profit Federation of American Scientists putting the figure at about 150 warheads now.

巴基斯坦的核武库正在以比预期更快的速度增长,美国科学家联盟(FAS)的一份可靠报告称,目前巴基斯坦的核弹头数量约为150枚。

In the FAS's Nuclear Notebook: Pakistani Nuclear Forces, 2018, the authors, Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris, suggest that this could mean the country is not only on target to have up to 250 warheads by 2025, but that its production of tactical nuclear weapons risked a quicker slide from conventional clashes to a nuclear war.

FAS的核笔记:2018年,《巴基斯坦核部队》,作者克里斯滕森和罗伯特·诺里斯,暗示这可能意味着这个国家计划到2050年拥有250枚弹头,而且战术核武器的生产有可能更快地从传统冲突转向核战争。

The report was put together using requests under the United States Freedom of Information Act and declassified documents. Dr Kristensen cautioned that the estimates came with considerable uncertainty, given that all the nuclear nations shrouded their programmes in secrecy.

这份报告是根据《美国信息自由法》的请求和解密文件整理的。克里斯滕森博士告诫称,由于所有的核国家都将他们的计划保密,这些估计是相当不确定的。

Dr Kristensen, director, FAS Nuclear Information Project, has a resume steeped in analytical research including, early in his career, a long stint at Greenpeace, the environmental non-profit that, among other issues, also argues against reliance on nuclear power, saying it is ridden with problems and could also help spawn new nuclear powers.

克里斯滕森博士:FAS核信息项目,长期从事分析研究,包括在其职业生涯早期,长期在绿色和平组织工作,也反对对核能的依赖,说这充满问题,还可助长新核大国。

"Once one side starts using nuclear weapons, all bets are off," Dr Hans Kristensen tells Rediff.com's senior US contributor P Rajendran.

“一旦一方开始使用核武器,所有的赌注都完了”克里斯滕森博士博士告诉Rediff.com网站的美国资深撰稿人P Rajendran。

 

You are reputed to provide the best publicly available information on nuclear arms worldwide. How do you go about analysing the information?

众所周知,你们提供了世界范围内关于核武器的最佳公开信息。你如何分析这些信息?

First of all, the fact that we are called the best estimates reflects that there are no official estimates -- the point being that none of those countries release any information about how many nuclear weapons they have. So it is up to others to make those estimates.

首先,我们称之为“最佳估计”,这一事实反映出,没有官方估计——关键是,这些国家都没有公布任何有关它们拥有多少核武器的信息。因此,做出这些估计取决于其他人。

What we have done over the years is to develop a methodology by which we combine information from declassified documents here in the United States and elsewhere and combine that with other information about the country's military postures, specifically what kind of weapons systems they have, what kind of strategy they have, and also how much fissile material they are thought to have available for their nuclear weapons programme.

这些年我们所做的是开发一种方法,通过这种方法将美国和其他国家的揭秘文件信息结合起来,并将其与其他国家的军事姿态信息相结合,具体包括武器系统,作战战略,有多少裂变材料是用于他们的核武器计划。

We try to combine all of these related information into estimates that obviously come with considerable uncertainty because we don't know the specifics of the country's nuclear weapons numbers.

我们试图将所有这些相关信息整合到评估中,这显然会带来相当大的不确定性,因为我们不知道该国核武器数量的具体情况。

 

You are also looking at the political situation in those countries, right?

你也在观察这些国家的政治形势,对吧?

Nuclear forces develop slowly and so the political climate can change and, of course, it can have an effect on weapons programmes.

核力量发展缓慢,因此政治气候可能发生变化,当然也可能对武器计划产生影响。

But over the years nuclear weapons programmes tend to follow longer-term plans rather than quickly change depending on the mood between countries.

但多年来,核武器计划往往遵循较长期的计划,而不是根据国与国之间的情绪变化而迅速改变。

So if a country plans to have nuclear weapons soon, such as in the case of Saddam Hussein, president and dictator of Iraq for about 23 years, it cannot develop one easily.

因此,如果一个国家打算尽快拥有核武器,比如萨达姆•侯赛因,这位伊拉克总统和独材者执政23年,也没能研制出核武器。

Yeah, there's a long period of design development that all countries must go through.

是的,所有国家都必须经历一个漫长的设计发展时期。

India and Pakistan went through that in the seventies, eighties and nineties before they got to the point of even detonating nuclear weapons.

印度和巴基斯坦在70年代、80年代和90年代都经历过这种情况,他们甚至还没有达到引爆核武器的地步。

 

Given the chaotic nature of the nuclear standoff in South Asia, and the fact that there are actually three actors present -- India, China and Pakistan -- can Pakistan's increased nuclear weaponry escalate the arms race there?

考虑到南亚核僵局的混乱本质,以及实际上有三个参与者——印度、中国和巴基斯坦——巴基斯坦增加核武器是否会加剧那里的军备竞赛?

Yes, specially India and Pakistan will look closely at each other's nuclear postures and obviously follow what the other side is doing. That can have real impact on what they decide to do.

是的,特别是印度和巴基斯坦将密切关注对方的核姿态,显然也会关注对方在做什么。这可能会对他们的决定产生真正的影响。

If you look at the Pakistani and Indian arsenals they were, for the first couple of decades, they were relatively closely linked in terms of what categories of weapons they developed.

如果你看看巴基斯坦和印度的军火库,在最初的几十年里,他们在开发的武器种类上有相对紧密的联系。

But within the last decade we have seen some change, for example, in the case of Pakistan, putting more emphasis on what appears to be more tactical nuclear weapons.

但在过去10年里,我们看到了一些变化,例如,巴基斯坦更加强调的似乎是战术核武器。

They have their reasons for doing that, and India seems to be putting more emphasis on longer-range systems because of the way it is planning vis-a-vis China.

他们这样做是有原因的,而印度似乎更强调远程系统,因为它是针对中国。

 

So Pakistan is planning for trouble with India, while India is planning in the longer term for China?

所以巴基斯坦是在为来自印度的麻烦做打算,而印度是在为中国做长远打算?

Well, India's planning for Pakistan and China.

印度对巴基斯坦和中国都有计划。

The Bharatiya Janata Party was the party in power when the first nuclear tests were conducted in 1998 (after India exploded an atom bomb in 1974) even though, as you suggested, all the material must have been ready for some time.

印度人民党是1998年进行第一次核试验时的执政党(印度在1974年引爆了一颗原子弹),尽管正如你所说,所有的核材料肯定已经准备好一段时间了。

 

Did the perception that India's current BJP-led government is more combative have helped change Pakistan's posture?

目前印度人民党领导的政府更加好斗是否有助于改变巴基斯坦的姿态?

The main reason Pakistan has put more emphasis on tactical nuclear weapons appears to be their concern about what to do about India's larger conventional forces.

巴基斯坦更加重视战术核武器的主要原因似乎是他们担心如何对付印度庞大的常规部队。

(If) those forces invaded Pakistan would they be able to go in and basically win without India ever having to cross the nuclear threshold.

如果这些军队入侵巴基斯坦,他们能进入并基本上赢得胜利,而无需印度跨过核门槛。

The Pakistani planners concluded that they needed to have tactical nuclear weapons to stop such an invasion without having to resort to strategic nuclear attacks against India.

巴基斯坦规划者得出结论,他们需要有战术核武器来阻止这种入侵,而不必对印度发动战略核攻击。

 

Do you think any low-level nuclear use could lead to a larger nuclear war?

你认为任何低级别核使用都会导致更大规模的核战争吗?

Yes, that's always the danger, of course, not just in the case of India and Pakistan, but in all Nuclear Weapons States.

是的,这总是危险的,当然,不仅是在印度和巴基斯坦,而且在所有拥有核武器的国家都是。

Once the military starts to draw up plans for using nuclear weapons in what you could call the pre-strategic environment, then you get two situations.

一旦军方开始制定在所谓的战略前环境中使用核武器的计划,就会出现两种情况。

One, of course, is that nuclear weapons could be used earlier in a crisis than otherwise.

当然,其中之一就是核武器在危机中可能更早被使用。

Once you start using nuclear weapons on one side it is very unlikely that the other side will just be sitting there, saying, 'Oh, I guess we shouldn't do that.' They will take measures, of course.

一旦一方开始使用核武器,另一方就不太可能只是坐在那里说:“哦,我想我们不应该那样做。”。他们肯定会采取措施。

If India has decided that it is necessary to invade Pakistan for whatever reason and its forces are being annihilated inside Pakistan because of the Pakistani use of tactical nuclear weapons, it is very hard to imagine the Indians would say, 'I guess we were wrong, we're just going to pull back here.'

不管出于什么原因,如果印度已经决定有必要入侵巴基斯坦,如果因为巴基斯坦使用战术核武器,导致印度军队在巴基斯坦境内被歼灭,很难想象印度人会说,“我想我们是错了,我们将撤回去。”

So once one side starts using nuclear weapons, all bets are off.

因此,一旦一方开始使用核武器,所有的赌注都完了。

 

India does have a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, but if there is this reason, could it go all the way?

印度确实有不首先使用核武器的政策,但如果出于这个原因,它会一直坚持不使用吗?

When countries have no first use policies, these are policies that play more of a role in peacetime.

当国家有不首先使用核武器的政策时,这些政策在和平时期发挥了更大的作用。

I have a hard time imagining that a country in a war where significant national interests were threatened, that it would say, 'Oh, gee, we should not use it first because we have a no first use policy.'

我很难想象一个国家在战争中,国家利益受到威胁时,它会说:‘哦,天哪,我们不应该首先使用核武器,因为我们有不首先使用核武器的政策。’

Once you get into that situation, countries will do pretty much what they think is necessary. I see the value and the message of no first use policies more as something that's important in peacetime.

一旦进入这种情况,国家就会做它们认为必要的事情。我认为不首先使用核武器政策的价值在和平时期更为重要。

 

The new government in Pakistan led by Imran Khan is believed to be working with or controlled by the military. Could that at least in the short term reduce the chance of a conflict with India?

据信由伊姆兰汗领导的巴基斯坦新政府正在与军方合作或由军方控制。至少在短期内,这会降低与印度发生冲突的可能性吗?

We don't really know what the new Pakistani government believes about these issues. It is in any case very unlikely to fundamentally change the role of Pakistan's nuclear weapons. So we'll have to wait and see.

我们真的不知道巴基斯坦新政府对这些问题的看法。无论如何,它都不太可能从根本上改变巴基斯坦核武器的角色。所以我们只能拭目以待了。

China is a bigger threat to India than Pakistan even if it is less likely to act precipitately.

中国对印度的威胁比巴基斯坦更大,尽管中国采取紧急行动的可能性更小。

When you wrote about Chinese nuclear weapons you addressed it essentially from the viewpoint of America.

当你写关于中国核武器的文章时,你基本上是从美国的观点出发。

 

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