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印度坏账问题不止是单纯的金融问题!

India's bad loan problem is not a purely financial one!

April 03, 2017 11:57 IST

印度坏账问题不止是单纯的金融问题!

It is a national economic problem and one that requires a po itical solution hand in hand with a clear go nment commitment to stand behind core national assets, says Vinayak Chatterjee.

这是一个国家经济问题。我们需要和一个站在国家核心资产背后的清晰的政府委员会一起联手推出一个解决方案。Vinayak Chatter姬说。

India’s bad loan problem continues to keep policymakers awake at night. The most comprehensive overview of it, as well as a proposed solution, has been presented in the recent Economic Survey, which addressed a whole chapter to this “twin bnce sheet” issue - the dual problem of tottering corporate bnce sheets weakened by heavy bad de ts and bank bnce sheets awash in red ink.

印度的坏账问题持续地让政策制定者急得晚上睡不着觉。关于这个问题的概况,同时也是这个问题的推荐解决方案,已经在最近的经济调查中展现。在经济调查报告中用了整整一章的篇幅描写了“孪生资产负债表”问题。----这是一种摇摇欲坠的企业资产负债表被严重的坏账所削弱,同时银行的资产负债表赤字泛滥的双重问题。



There is no doubt that the problem is one of the most serious ever faced by India’s financial sector. The estimate of non-performing loans is now around $191 billion, or well over eight per cent of gross domestic product. This estimate has doubled since 2013.

这无疑是印度金融部门面临过的最严峻的问题。现在,不良资产的估值已经达到了1910亿美元,也就是超过了印度GDP的8%。这个估值已经比2013年翻了一倍了。

Thirteen per cent of the gross non-performing loans are from the infrastructure sector. This level of non-performing assets means that banks are now deeply reluctant to fund infra projects and companies.

不良借款的13%是来自基础设施部门。如此高的不良资产水平意味着银行现在会极度不情愿为基础设施项目和公司提供资金。

Recent specific events such as the arrest of a former chairman of IDBI have only deepened this reluctance. So, private sector involvement and consequent investment-driven growth and job creation languish.

最近的具体事例就是IDBI前主席被铺入狱。这更加剧了银行不情愿给基础设施项目和公司贷款的情绪。因此,私营经济领域被牵连。继而由投资驱动的增长和创造新工作岗位都出现了枯萎。

Meanwhile, even as banks dither on solving the problem, project assets face the increasing risk of obsolescence from lack of maintenance, upgradation and, in many cases, completion.

与此同时,正当银行为解决这个问题而慌乱时,工程项目却因为维护不善引起的折旧、废弃、更新升级和各种莫名的情况而面临的成本花费不断增加的风险。

Initiatives by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) to tackle this problem have had extremely limited success. Schemes like the 5/25 (elongation of loans to 25 years by changing hands every five years), strategic de t restructuring (SDR) and the sustainable structuring of stressed assets (S4A) have not made any meaningful impact.

印度储备银行(译者:印度央行)对这个问题的初步战术只取得了极其有限的成果。其它计划,例如5/25计划(通过每5年换手将借款延长至25年),战略债务重组计划和重点资产可持续构建计划,都没有取得任何效果。



Another expected amelioration - that by private sector asset reconstruction companies (ARC) - has not taken off. Private sector ARCs were seen as specialists in bad loans, who could succeed in reviving such assets where banks had failed.

其它的预期的措施----通过私营部门“资产重组公司们”执行----还没有开始。私营的资产重组公司被认为是处理坏账的行家里手,能够成功挽回银行已经处理失败的资产。

But banks have been reluctant to sell to such ARCs and take a “haircut” on their loans. In 2014, sales to ARCs slowed even further as a result of new rules requiring them to pay a greater share of the purchase price of assets upfront in cash.

但是银行并不情愿将资产卖给资产重组公司们并被“剪羊”。在2014年,由于出台了银行需要用现金预付款的形式分享更多资产采购价格的新规定,向资产重组公司的销售进一步降低。

Moreover, private sector ARCs have typically been thinly capitalised, thus restricting their room for manoeuvre and risk-taking. In addition, they by themselves do not have the stature to individually handle the multidimensional completies involved.

此外,私营的资产重组公司们是典型的薄本经营。这就限制了它们的辗转空间和抵御风险的能力。另外,它们的规模不足以独自处理这种多方面的复杂情况。

The Economic Survey takes a different approach. It proposes a more enhanced role for the go nment and proposes the setting up of a centralised Public Sector Asset Rehabilitation Agency (PARA) that would buy up the bigger non-performing assets.

经济调查报告给出了不同的解决方法。建议更加强化政府的角色并且设立一个中央公共资产修复机构(简称PARA)来购买最大的不良资产。

A single such institution set up with state backing would address problems with contextual solutions. For instance, there is a serious problem in getting different banks, who have exposure to a given project, to come to an agreement on restructuring a loan.

设立这样一个单一的国有机构可以解决一系列的关系协调问题。例如,让不同的银行们去承担一个指定的项目,就重建贷款达成协议,就会有一系列的问题。

Centralising the de t in a single agency addresses this. Further, public sector enterprises could be asked to temporarily run such assets.

把债务集中于一个单一机构。未来,可以由公共事业部门临时运营这些资产。



The demonstrated appetite for foreign institutional investors to pick up brownfield assets could be met, and National Investment and Infrastructure Fund (NIIF) utilised as a channelling agency.

可以同意国外投资机构购买棕地资产(译者:棕地资产,就是已经建设好厂房等基础设施的资产。相对的,还没有建设任何基础设施的投资叫绿地资产。)国家投资和基础设施基金(简称NIIF)可以作为渠道代理。

The entire capital for PARA is not expected to come from the go nment; it has been suggested that it could even be structured as a 49:51 entity with a majority private sector stake. The important point is to make sure that the entity has, and is seen to have, strong backing from the go nment, much like the NIIF.

不能期望公共资产修复机构(简称PARA)的全部资金都来自政府。建议其实体采用49:51的结构,主要由私营股份占主导。重要的是要让这个实体拥有,或看起来拥有政府作为后台的强力支持。就像国家投资和基础设施基金(简称NIIF)那样。

The po itical establishment has been understandably wary of getting too involved, given the pential for “crony” and “suit-boot-arkansan” accusations. But over 80 per cent of the log-jammed funds belong to the people of India - through public de t and equity markets.

可以理解的是应该谨防当权者的过度卷入和把项目授予潜在的“密友”。但是超过80%的困境基金都来自于印度普通百姓----通过国债和股市。

Such stuck infrastructure assets are national economic assets; as a result, any go nment has an obligation to ensure they are kept in good working condition.

这些被卡住的基础设施资产都是国家经济资产。作为结果,印度人民会感谢任何一个确保这些资产良好运作的政府。

There is also a false equivalence between a non-performing asset on a purely private good - such as, say, a passenger car, and one on a road asset. Under RBI norms, delayed payments on either set of loans are treated in the same way.However, one asset is a purely private consumer good while the other is a critical investment with wide and far-reaching “external effects” well beyond the original costs of the project.

在不良资产和纯私人财产间,也存在一个不正当的相等换算关系。例如,私人乘用车和一项公共道路资产。在印度储备银行(印度的央行)规范下,其中任何一方推迟偿还贷款,处理方式都是相同的。虽然,前者只是一个纯私人消费品,而后者是一项重大投资,具有广泛而深远的“外部效应”,其意义远远超出了项目的原始成本。

Moreover, the process by which a PARA can acquire a stressed infra asset can be made transparent, clear and overseen by a venerable and independent committee.

此外,通过公共资产修复机构(PARA)来着重处理这些基础设施资产,就可以通过成立一个令人尊敬的和独立的委员会从而进行透明的和清晰的监督。



The price at which such assets are to be acquired would be set by such a committee, thus reducing the pential risk of a go nment being accused of mfide bailouts.

这些资产的价格也可以由这个委员会确立。这样就可以减少政府因为恶意抽资而被告上法庭的风险。

Further, any assets and the price at which they are sold to PARA could be made immune to reviews by investigation or vigilance agencies if the process of sale is clear and transparent.

更多的,任何被卖给公共资产修复机构(PARA)的资产及其价格,都可以免于调查或警戒机构的影响,因为销售过程是清晰的和透明的。

Internationally, the general approach of go nment being closely involved in bailing out large-scale private entities has generally met with success.

国际上,政府深度参与大型私人企业的保释工作的常规方法已经被成功地广泛接受。

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